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BOOKS REVIEWED
Law Without Sanctions: Order in Primitive Societies and the World
Community. By Michael Barkun. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1968.
Pp. vii, 179. $6.50.
Few jurisprudential writers have had such an enduring influence on AngloAmerican law as the nineteenth century British analytical theorist, John Austin.'
What has come to be known as the "command of the sovereign" theory was
described by Austin as follows: "Of the laws or rules set by men to men, some
are established by political superiors, sovereign and subject: by persons exercising supreme and subordinate government, in independent nations, or independent political societies ....
To the aggregate of the rules thus established,
or to some aggregate forming a portion of that aggregate, the term law, as used
simply and strictly, is exclusively applied."2 Essential to the existence of a legal
system in the analytical estimation is the availability of a sanction which can
be employed by the sovereign in the event of a failure to obey a command.3
Michael Barkun, a political scientist at Syracuse University, contends, as
have many others, that the Austinian concept is an inadequate explanation of
law as a social phenomenon. 4 "The command theory of law gives evidence of
default on two counts. First, it asks a limited and unfruitful series of questions
that leads to an understanding of a circumscribed set of sanctions, at the expense of other features of the legal system. Second, it systematically excludes
much in man's experience that has borne the name of law."5 In particular, Professor Barkun submits two major manifestations of legal order for which the
Austinians cannot provide an adequate explanation: the interrelationship of
7
primitive tribes,6 and international law.
Law Without Sanctions is a scholarly, sometimes tedious, examination of the
presence of an identifiable system of public order in primitive societies and the
analogous characteristics reflected in the contemporary international community.
The implication is that from a study of the former we will be better prepared to
understand and cope with conflicts which arise in the latter. This is another in
the rapidly growing body of works advocating cross-disciplinary study of law.
1. See generally Stumpf, Austin's Theory of the Separation of Law and Morals, 14 Vand.
L. Rev. 117 (1960).
2. J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 11 (Humanistic Press 1965).
3. "The evil which will probably be incurred in case a command be disobeyed or (to
use an equivalent expression) in case a duty, be broken, is frequently called a sanction, or
an enforcement of obedience. Or (varying the phrase) the command or the duty is said
to be sanctioned or enforced by the chance of incurring the evil." Id. at IS.
4. As is frequently the case in jurisprudential controversies, the disputants are not so
much disagreeing as talking about different things.
5. M. Barkun, Law Without Sanctions: Order in Primitive Societies and the World Community 11 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Barkun].
6. Referred to anthropologically as a "segmentary lineage system."
7. Austin categorically denied that international law could come within his definition. J.
Austin, supra note 2, at 201.
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In the words of the author, "Law has for too long been anchored in common
sense."" When the analytical blinders of traditional legal scholarship prove
inadequate to provide answers for modern problems, then it is time "to revise
the theory, not to doubt our vision. ' 9
It is a difficult book, more difficult than it need be. The writing meanders
within vaguely designated chapter headings, the language at times seems unnecessarily abstruse, the interrelation of the chapters is often unclear. Even
with several readings, the reader frequently is in considerable doubt as to precisely where he is in the author's chain of thought. Yet patiently perused, the
work does provide many interesting and thought-provoking ideas.
At the outset Professor Barkun, with acknowledged reliance on the work of
Richard A. Falk, 10 distinguishes between "vertical" and "horizontal" legal
systems.
A vertical legal system consists of a hierarchy of norms that is paralleled by a hierarchy of institutions that has the wherewithal to compel obedience to its commands.
The horizontal legal system is a world apart; its participants are at least formally
equal, rather than the occupants of a carefully scaled hierarchy. The implementation
of its rules cannot very well depend solely upon force (it is nowhere sufficiently concentrated so that force can be effectively and invariably applied); instead, self-help
and self-restraint take the place of the sovereign. Both systems, of course, are pure
types, but more or less approximated in the real world."
Vertical legal systems are amenable to Austinian analysis. Horizontal legal
systems are not, and it is to this type of legal order that the author primarily
directs his attention. Relying on studies by a number of cultural anthropologists,
Professor Barkun outlines the intricate legal relationships which permeate a
society of primitive tribes, notwithstanding the absence of an overriding sovereign authority with effective sanctioning power. Thereafter, an analogous
relationship is described in the interaction of states in the international community. 12
Following an explanation of the manner in which controversies arise in horizontal legal systems, the author turns to what he designates as "The Social
Bases of Law." 13 The discussion follows the conventional argument of the
sociological jurisprudents, the significant point for present purposes being that
norms of behavior arise out of society before they become a matter of legal
duty, rather than the converse-that social patterns are imposed on society
8.
9.

Barkun at 166.
Id. at 10.

10. See Falk, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal
Order, 32 Temp. L.Q. 295 (1959); Falk, The Reality of International Law, 14 World Pol.
353 (1962).

11. Barkun at 16.
12. "Segmentary lineage systems and international relations . . . are stateless societies
whose major structural characteristics are substantially the same. Both consist of components that interact in regular ways, but there is no centralization of power that might produce a functioning hierarchy of command." Id. at 34.
13.

Id. at 59-74.
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by the sovereign authority. The presence of such a "living law"11 4 is particularly
relevant to a horizontal legal system in which an institutionalized sanctioning
procedure is not available. The author acknowledges that any attempt to study
diverse cultures runs the risk of misinterpretation because of the conscious and
unconscious preconceptions-the "perceptual categories"-of the observer 1 5
"[W] e shall see that law lies as it were, in the eye of the beholder."' ,,
The significance of such differences in perception becomes apparent in the
final chapters of the book concerned with what the author designates as "Mediation," the procedure by which conflicts arising in a legal order are resolved.
"Mediation" may be explicit, in which instance a third party, perhaps a judge,
invokes a designated system of values on the disputants. Or it may be implicit,
in which instance the disputants endeavor to settle their disagreement themselves. The success of such efforts will depend largely on the extent to which
they share common values or "perceptual categories." Professor Barkun provides this example of the latter process:
After evaluating the role of China in the Vietnam war, the United States bad moved
upon the premise that the bombing of the northern capital would be interpreted
merely as part of the perceptual complex called "the Vietnam conflict," not as a component of a larger conflict directed at China itself. This conclusion was based upon
the supposition that Americans and Chinese,
in organizing the world that is external
17
to themselves, did this in like manner.
Having begun with a rejection of the Austinian concept of law, Professor
Barkun concludes with an enumeration of "legal universals" which he contends
will be found in all societies both vertical and horizontal. Law, we are told, is a
set of interrelated symbols, all of which have some empirical referents. These
symbols may be manipulated and can be arranged in propositional form. "Law
as a symbol system is a means of conceptualizing and managing the social
environment."'.8 The legal process involves (1) "the correlation of fact-situations
and normative outcomes"' 9 and (2) "the transformation of dyadic interactions
into triadic interactions"20 i.e., the employment of explicit mediation.
For those trained in the law, the subject matter, the method of analysis, and
the language may seem somewhat alien. If the study of law need escape its
anchorage in common sense those advocating reform might make the transition
a little less harsh. Apparently this is Professor Barkun's first book,21 and if it
14. Cf. E. Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1936).
15. Cf. C. Kluckhohn, The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians, in Ideological Differences and World Order 356 (F. Northrop ed. 1949); F. Northrop, Man, Nature and God
30-49 (1962).

16. Barkun at 79.
17. Id.at 98-99.
18. Id. at 151.

19. Id.
20.

Id.

21. For a related article, see Barkun, Bringing the Insights of Behavioral Science to
International Rules, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 1639 (1967).
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is not entirely successful, it does afford significant new ideas to the study of
law in general and international law in particular. It may be anticipated that
in the future the author will expand upon these notions with greater clarity.
JOSEPH G. Coox*

The Warren Court. By Archibald Cox. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1968. Pp. vi, 144. $4.95.
Can there be an intellectually satisfying way in which Supreme Court decisions interpreting the living Constitution can be analyzed?-Arthur Selwyn Miller'
Professor Cox's book, an expanded collection of a series of lectures delivered
in the summer of 1967 to an audience of "laymen and lawyers,"- is an interesting
and useful compendium of what seems to be the dominant attitude among today's lawyers toward both the product and the performance of the Warren
Court. The material covered by the author is not a neglected area and his significant premises and conclusions are neither original nor startling. There would
clearly be substantial agreement among the legal profession with Professor Cox's
views that: (1) the Warren Court, motivated by a desire to reform social and
political ills, has spearheaded a revolution in constitutional doctrine; (2) there
are occasions when the Court should play an active role in reforming such ills,
even at the price of changing constitutional law; (3) any reformist Court is
necessarily confronted with the horns of a dilemma: how to work a change in
legal doctrine and yet retain a wide respect for the rule of law. Professor Cox
wastes no time elaborating these and equally familiar premises. The central
concern in his book is the theme of most significance to lawyers as a professional
group: how well has the Warren Court functioned as an instrument of social
reform? Again his basic conclusion is familiar and widely held: granted
that many of the Court's recent reforms are essential, good, humane and long
over-due, granted that few would wish to return to the days of compulsory
racial segregation, legislative malapportionment and unrestrained law enforcement, nevertheless the Warren Court has unnecessarily and all too frequently
acted not as a court required by fundamental precept to decide "according to a
continuity of principle found in the words of the Constitution, judicial prece3
dents, traditional understanding and like sources of law." Rather the Court
has all too often acted as a Council of Wise Men, basing its decisions as much on
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.

1.

Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 881,

911 (1963).
2. Cox, Preface to A. Cox, The Warren Court at v (1968). These lectures in turn appear
to be an elaboration of themes which Professor Cox developed in a recent article. See Cox,
Forward to The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91 (1966).
3. A. Cox, The Warren Court 21 (1968).
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intuition as on the reasoned application of legal rules. In short, this is another
in the long series of similar indictments brought against the Warren Court: its
decisions are "unprincipled" and the results which the court decrees are not
based upon recognized authority. To the obvious objection which laymen in the
audience might raise to this observation ("so what?"), Professor Cox hastens to
state another article from the lawyers' creed: in order to command respect for
its decisions the Court must manifest an ability "to rationalize a constitutional
judgment in terms of principles referable to accepted sources of law."4 To the
extent, then, that the Court fails to persuade lawyers and laymen that its decisions are based on enduring principles, the Court dissipates its power both as
an institution and as an effective social reformer. Judged by this test the Warren
Court grades low.
It would be a disservice to Professor Cox not to emphasize that his evaluation of the Warren Court's professional performance is in many ways unlike
run-of-the-mill critiques of the Court which have reached similar conclusions.
He is not out to disparage the Court for some ulterior purpose-if the Court
has ever gored any of his pet oxen, he successfully hides the fact. Nor is
he one to cripple the Court or weaken its influence in the nation. Unlike many
critics, he approves of the significant reforms, finds them moderate and "in keeping with the true genius of our institutions." 5 He is sensitive to all the difficulties
which the Court faces daily: the questions for decision are complex, counsel
may present them inadequately, time is short and so on. The book is remarkably
free of anything carping or petty. He is willing to concede that his faith in the
value of opinions based on sound legal reasoning may be misplaced or excessively
purist, much like the attitude Arnold Palmer might have toward a competitor
who never missed a putt though he executed these shots with his club gripped
in his teeth. All of which, coupled with the impressive lawyer-like skills reflected
on every page, makes this book a particularly devastating documentation of the
familiar charge that the Warren Court has been, to put it mildly, unprofessional.
Random examples demonstrate this: regarding the state action problem in the
sit-in cases, "no rationale was offered ... which was not entirely open-ended"; 0
in Reitman v. Mldkey, "the opinion fails to probe the true issues behind the
doctrine'of State action ... the opinion is inscrutable . . . ."; -- the prevailing
opinion in Time, Inc. v. Hill failed to address itself "to the consequences of its
enthusiasm for protecting the press against the individuals whom it injures"; 9 as
for Justice Black (for the Court) and Justice Douglas (dissenting) in Adderly
v. Florida, "[o]ne wonders whether either opinion gets to the root of the issue"; 9 and apropos Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court's opinion
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 111.
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"tseems almost perversely to repudiate every conventional guide to legal judgment."' 0
To repeat, it is likely that a majority of lawyers and laymen would agree
with Professor Cox's findings, and he makes a persuasive argument. How then
explain or justify one's dissatisfaction with the latest verdict in the continuing
trial of the Warren Court? Initially, it should be noted that the trial started
more than ten years ago," and surely by now all the evidence necessary to
support the charge of unprincipled, unreasoned opinions is in. Might we not,
then, begin to spend our time on other matters relating to the Court? For example, how did the notion ever get about that the Court ever issued opinions
based on tightly reasoned, logical applications of continuing constitutional
principles? What are the criteria for identifying such opinions? Who can name
one? Some of us in the hinterlands, cut off by communication and transportation problems from easy access to the sources of current opinion, still accept as
dogma views about the nature of opinion writing which, for all we know, might
long ago have been exploded. Yet there are enclaves where it is held even today
that Marshall mastered the bootstrap argument and then called it quits, that
Holmes would neither state nor rely on an enduring principle of constitutional
law even if he could be forced to admit one existed, where no one any longer
even tries to penetrate the murkiness of the Brandeis opinion in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 12 and where even laymen giggle nervously when first exposed
to the Cardozo-Frankfurter Due Process clause jargon: "ordered liberty,"
"shock the conscience," "civilized decencies" and all that. Perhaps some of us are
uncertain about the value of piling up example after example of the Warren
Court's inability or unwillingness to write competent opinions partly because
the Justices blithely ignore all the complaints and partly because we have misunderstood Holmes' ancient dictum: "General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than
any articulate major premise."'1 3 But if that does not paraphrase as Lawyers'
Logic-Icing On The Cake, then what does it mean?
Professor Hart once made a convincing case that the Justices do not always
consider or even listen to each other's views. 1 4 This is so deplorable and inexcusable it needs no comment. He also spoke of the need for opinions to be grounded
in reason and for the Court to be "a voice of reason, charged with the creative
function . . . of articulating and developing impersonal and durable principles

.... "15 He suggested the Court might so function if its case load were reduced,
but even if the Court considered but one case a term, there is no guarantee of
improvement in quality. Professor Wechsler has tendered examples of "prin10. Id. at 125.
11. If one dates it from the "opinions that do not opine" views expressed in Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 3 (1957).
12. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
14. Hart, Forward to The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 123 (1959).
15. Id. at 99.
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cipled"
analysis: 16 e.g., Holmes for the Court in Pcnnsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma7

hon' and dissenting in Abrams v. United States"' and Gitlow v. New I'ork.10
The key statement of principle in Pennsylvania Coal Co. is, "[the
general
rule at least, is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." - The rule parodies
itself and deserves to be remembered only as an early example of what is now
called Black Humor. As for the famous dissents, there is not even a pretense of
articulating clearly anything remotely resembling a rational principle, unless it
is that twenty years imprisonment for multi-lingual petty political agitation
should be "recognized" as a bit much.
Not to put too fine a point upon it, there are some of us who remain unreconstructed. Many of this small band confess to having been corrupted by Arthur
Selwyn Miller. 21 We more or less share these minority beliefs:
1.Warren Court opinions parse as well as any other opinions from 1803 onward.
2. Chief Justice Warren's opinion in the first school segregation case'- is a model of
what a significant reformist opinion should be.
3. The "principled" opinion philosophy was invented to serve two purposes: to inhibit
the Court from acting as an activist Court and to flog it after the fact.
4. The current Justices are entirely capable of playing the logic-chopping, precedentcomparing game. The interesting question is, why don't they? The tentative answer
is that the Court necessarily functions in ways fully as inscrutable as the Congress
and the President.
5. We all agree with the statement, "the major influence in judicial decisions is not
fiat but principles which bind the judges as well as the litigants and which apply
consistently among all men today, and also yesterday and tomorrow. I cannot
prove these points, but they are the faith to which we lawyers are dedicated."M
All lawyers believe this and many other things, some silly. But our small group
does not take our faith very seriously nor even pretend to live by it for more than
an hour or two on Sunday morning.
Meanwhile, until the millennium arrives, when someone from the WechslerHart-Bickel school has the decency to set forth the criteria for a Model Activist Judicial Opinion, or when the Justices are transformed into competent
opinion writers when tested by the rigorous standards of all segments of the
American legal profession, let us consider, using one of the Warren Court's most
popular, unprincipled, open-ended guides, "more reasonable alternatives" for restoring to the Court some measure of its lost power and prestige so that the
Court may continue to reform us as needed.
ALBERT 'M.

VITTE*

16. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
24-25 (1959).
17. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
18. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
19. 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925).
20. 260 U.S. at 415.

21. See Miller, supra note 1.
22. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US. 483 (1954).
23. A. Cox, supra note 3, at 21-22.
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
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Formation of Contracts: A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems
(Vols. 1 & 2). Edited by Rudolph B. Schlesinger. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana
Publications, Inc. 1968. Pp. xv, 1727. $35.00.
Assemble nine outstanding scholars in the field of comparative law from a
variety of countries,' give them the occasional assistance of other leading
scholars, put them to work for ten years on the relatively narrow topic of
offer and acceptance 2 in the law of contracts and one would have every right
to expect a highly thorough, innovative, and useful work product. The expectations of this consumer of the product were amply fulfilled.
Comparative legal research offers awesome difficulties, both as to the manner
of research and of reporting the fruits of that research. To illustrate, the
relatively simple question has been asked: Do civil law systems recognize
the privilege against self-incrimination? It has received relatively simple
answers. Judge Holtzoff has answered it with a resounding "no," attacking the
civil law as oppressive and tyrannical on this score.8 On the other hand, at the
International Congress of Criminal Law held in 1933, the United States' system of criminal proceedings was denounced as tyrannical by civil lawyers on
the ground that the accused's interest in not incriminating himself was unduly
hampered by the requirement that he testify, if at all, under oath.4 This interest is better protected in civilian systems, the argument runs, because the accused can freely lie with impunity. The comparative lawyer realizes that both
these views are superficial and in order to come to meaningful analysis he must
know much more about subsidiary rules, practices0 and judicial attitudes in
the countries whose rules are being compared. More important, he will realize
that the initial question was improperly posed. The question presupposes that
there can be a meaningful research into a comparison of concepts; but the
comparitivist soon learns that the only fruitful path is first to identify the
totality of legal concepts and rules affecting a life situation. Once this is
done a comparison of rules and concepts begins to be possible.
The methodology employed by the authors involves a novel approach. The
facts of reported decisions were distributed to the team members, each of
1. A listing of the countries is not possible, since the majority of the authors have
strong ties with more than one country. Listing them from the point of view of the
country in which they hold their primary teaching positions, the following countries are
represented: The United States by Rudolph B. Schlesinger (general editor and co-author),
Ian R. Macneil, and W. J. Wagner; France by Pierre G. Bonassies; The British Commonwealth by Johannes Leyser; Germany by Werner Lorenz; Switzerland by Karl H. Neumayer;
India by Ishwar Chandra Saxena; Italy by Gino Gorla. In addition to the countries listed,
the study takes in account the law of Austria and South Africa as well as Poland and
other Communist legal systems.
2. The title, "Formation of Contracts" is perhaps somewhat misleading. Questions of
contract formation other than offer and acceptance are not treated except tangentially.
3. Holtzoff, Book Review, 20 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 250 (1951).
4. See Pekelis, Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies: A Comparative Study, 41
Mich. L. Rev. 665, 679 (1943). See also R. Schlesinger, Comparative Law-Cases--TextsMaterials 14-17 (2d ed. 1959).
5. E.g., What is the practice in the United States regarding indictments for perjury
committed by a defendant while testifying in his own behalf?
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whom prepared working papers on the probable approach to, and outcome of,
these cases in the legal system upon which he was reporting. Out of the working
paper came individual reports on the state of the law on the issue in one legal
system. The author of the report was then subjected to vigorous oral examination conducted by the entire research team as to whether he had accurately
dealt with the issue from all possible aspects. Subsequently, a general report
synthesizing the law in all the jurisdictions under consideration was prepared
by an assigned reporter and revised under the impact of further group discussions. After this, the individual reports were rewritten to reflect the
structure of the general reports. This is indeed rigorous discipline, but, as the
editor points out, the oral discussions produced the somewhat startling revelation that it is well nigh impossible for one scholar armed with individual reports
from all participants to prepare an accurate synthesis. This revelation casts
doubt upon the value of a vast amount of comparative literature.6
My major quibbles with the two volumes relate to organization. The general
reports appear first in Volume I from pages 75-182. This is followed on pages
185-323 by introduction to the individual reports, selected statutes and
bibliography. The bulk of the material (pages 325-1693) consists of the
individual reports. 7 The publication is organized around classifications usually
found in Anglo-American literature on the law of contracts; e.g., "Offers Calling
for a Promise and Offers Calling for an Act" and "When Acceptance Becomes
Effective."
My first quibble has to do with the choice of compartments. Perhaps a book
in English should be organized around traditional common law pigeon-holes,
but I am not convinced this should wholly be so. First of all, this study is
aimed at an international audience. The younger generation of European
scholars by and large have a good mastery of English, but not of common law
concepts. They have a hunger for literature about common law systems written
from the perspective of their own systems.
Second, and more important, there are certain concepts which pervade the
law of offer and acceptance in many civil law countries which deserve separate
treatment. For example, in many civil law countries under the doctrine of culpa
in contrahendo an offeror may have the power to revoke an offer, thus preventing
the formation of a contract, but he may be subjected to tort liability for the
exercise of this power. Conceptually, the doctrine may have nothing to do
with the formation of contracts, but in an offer and acceptance situation the
doctrine may be of crucial importance in affecting the behavior of the parties.
It is occasionally and sporadically mentioned in the reports, 8 but there is no
unifying discussion as to when the doctrine is available and whether it is
available under differing circumstances in the various countries accepting it.
6. One might wonder if similar results would have been obtained if leading writers in
purely domestic fields such as Corbin, Wigmore and Williston had undergone such thorough
cross-examination by a panel of able scholars as to each section of their treatises.
7. In some instances, brief annotations were compiled instead of full-fledged reports.
8. See index under Culpa in Contrahendo, 2 R. Schlesinger, Formation of Contracts
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Schlesinger].
9. There are American solutions to some of the problems solved in cvil law countries
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Another omission is the lack of reports on the objective and subjective aspects
of mutual manifestation of assent. True, the individual reports often make
reference to the problem in particular contexts. The French reports are
particularly intriguing in this respect. We are frequently told in the French
reports that the Code Napoleon is based on a subjective theory of contract requiring actual consent, and that this theory, not without some opposition,
continues to dominate court decisions. Thus, for example, Professor Bonassies,
the French reporter, indicates that a French court would hold that an offeror
may revoke an offer without any attempt to communicate the revocation to the
offeree, provided only that he produces some objective evidence that this was
his intent prior to the perfection of an acceptance.1 This is subjectivism pressed
to its nearly logical extreme. On the other hand, we are informed that in
France an offeree's "duty to speak" is somewhat broader than in common law
systems." Thus in a variety of circumstances an offeree will be held to an
acceptance by silence no matter what his actual intent may be. The reporter
recognizes and discusses the difficulty of squaring such a burden placed upon the
offeree with the requirement of actual consent, but a separate unifying discussion of subjective and objective aspects of assent would have been most
helpful. Without such a unifying discussion a reader cannot comprehend, unless
he refers to scholarship extrinsic to these volumes, the rationale, practical
application and consequences of the following statement about German and
Swiss law:
If a written communication is worded so that it may be understood in good faith
to be an offer, and when in fact it is understood to be one and accepted as such, a
contract will be effected. If in such a case the communication was not meant to be
an offer, the author may invalidate the contract on the grounds of lack of consent."2
A quibble of a second kind has to do with the placement and content of the
general reports. As indicated above, the general reports are grouped together
soon after the introduction. Statements in the individual reports to the effect
that "French law is in general accord with the statements in the general
report," caused this reviewer to spend considerable time thumbing through the
first volume to find the general report in question. It would have made the
reader's task somewhat easier if each general report had been immediately
followed by the related individual report. As indicated above, the general
reports consist of about one-seventeenth of the total number of pages. In
essence they are black letter statements of the law coupled with statements
introductory to the individual reports. Could they have been fully integrated
syntheses of the individual reports in the manner of a chapter of a treatise?
Would this have had more value? I rather think so. On the other hand I
realize that perhaps another five years might have been required to accomplish
this goal.
by this doctrine. See Kessler and Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith,
and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1964).
10. 1 Schlesinger at 854. But the offeror may be liable for damages for exercising his
power of revocation. 1 id. at 852.
11. 2 id. at 1124-51. Indeed, it was formerly the rule that a merchant was always under
a "duty" to reply to an offer.
12. 1 id. at 368.
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Thus far this review has focused critically upon what the authors of these
two volumes have not done. A book review could almost infinitely expand upon
what the work under review has not done. Lest there be a grotesque misunderstanding, I will state emphatically and, I think, without overstatement that this
is one of the most important law books published in America in recent
decades. The editor's introduction is in good part devoted to the purposes which
he and his co-authors had in mind in preparing this study. These purposes
were multiple, but he focuses primarily on certain immediate and practical
functions of such a study in the context of international and trans-national law.
International law frequently makes reference to the "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." Such references are found in Article 38(1) (c)
of the statute of the International Court of Justice, in the charters and contracts of various international organizations, international arbitration agreements and other international and trans-national agreements. Where are such
principles to be found if there is no text which extracts such principles
from the positive law of the civilized nations? The authors thus hope in part
to fill this void in the literature and to forge a method which others may adopt
to discover further principles. If this were the primary worth of the study it
could be applauded as a useful tool for international practitioners. I, however,
do not view the primary utility and importance of these volumes in these terms.
Rather, I suspect that both the content and methodology of these volumes will
have far more ramifications in domestic than international matters.
Soon after independence was achieved from England, the courts and legislatures of the United States began to make significant departures from the
common law and in many respects developed a law of contracts that was more
responsive to commercial and non-commercial needs than the law inherited from
the mother country. No less an authority than Mr. Justice Story, himself the
author of many of these changes, ascribed this development of American law
not to the particular genius of Americans, but to the openness of American
lawyers, courts and legislatures to influences from the civil law of Europe.la
This influence has declined since Story's day but still remains viable both in
scholarly literature 14 and court decisions 15 and the comparative lawyer can
see provisions throughout the Uniform Commercial Code which were almost
13. Justice Story in 1834 wrote a summary of American law for a German publication.
Its recent publication in America is due to the efforts of Kurt H. Nadelmann. Story wrote
as follows:
"The Law of Balments, of Agency, of Partnership, of Insurance, of Bottomry, of
Promisory Notes, of Bills of Exchange, of Shipping and Navigation, and of other maritime
and commercial contracts, is generally, (not universally) the same as that of England,
except that the American law on these subjects is more expansive and comprehensive, and
liberal, borrowing freely from the law of Continental Europe, and more disposed to avail
itself of the best principles of commerce, which can be gathered from all foreign sources not
excluding even the civil law." Story, American Law, 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 9, 22 (1954).
14. Ignoring comparative literature, foreign law has played a large role in seminal
articles focused upon improving domestic law. E.g., Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373 (1936).
15. E.g., Frummer v. Hilton Int'l Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 539, 227 N.E.2d 851, 855, 281
N.Y.S2d 41, 46 (1967) (dissenting opinion). See Wolff, The Utility of Foreign Law to the
Practicing Lawyer, 27 A.B.A.J. 253 (1941).
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certainly influenced by the draftsman's knowledge of civil law systems. This
is not to say that there is any inherent superiority in the civil law systems
before which the common law should bow. In law, as in agriculture, there have
been highly successful instances of exotic transplants" as well as invigoration
by hybridization, 17 and both sides of the Atlantic (and Pacific) have received
8
benefits from these processes.'
For these processes to occur, however, there is a need for reliable and
accessible information. As the authors are well aware, many comparative
bi-national studies exist. In a case involving the issue of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations, Judge Breitel of the New York Court of Appeals was
able to cite eight studies in English relating to the law of as many different
foreign nations.19 Few lawyers or judges are likely to research so extensively
the laws of so many countries when at best the fruits of this research will be
merely persuasive authority to courts no longer generally habituated towards
arguments based on foreign law. A multinational study on the point in issue
renders such research readily accessible by juxtaposing and synthesizing a
variety of approaches and adds an added dimension to a mere statement of
what the rule is in, for example, France. Thus, I see the primary practical
utility of this study to American lawyers as a useful, persuasive source for
argument in a domestic court. To illustrate, there is a New York case which
held that identical offers which arose out of on-going negotiations and which
crossed in the mail constituted a contract.2 0 Both of the leading contracts
16. The lists of transplants into the common law is vast. It includes such matters as
the Statute of Frauds, [Rabel, The Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History,
63 L.Q. Rev. 174 (1947)], The Limited Partnership [Ames v. Downing, 1 Bradf. Sur. 321
(N.Y. 1850)], and the Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale [Washington, Damages in Contract at
Common Law, 47 L.Q. Rev. 345 (1931), 48 id. at 90 (1932)1.
17. Recent reforms in federal and state rules relating to international cooperation in
litigation were made after thorough comparative research. See, e.g., Smit, International
Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1015 (1965).
18. See Lenhoff, America's Cultural Contributions to Europe in the Realm of Law, 16
Buffalo L. Rev. 7 (1966). A leading European scholar has recently written that the
United States is at the "vanguard" of the contemporary world in development of those "now"
fields of law which have been necessitated by modem conditions, such as consumer
protection, oil and gas, urban development, and labor law. M. Cappelletti, I1 diritto
comparato e il suo insegnamento in rapporto ai bisogni della societa' moderna, 14
Rivista di diritto civile 162 (1968). I cannot accept this fully. While American legal scholars
may be more active in the field of urban development than legal scholars in his country,
it seems to me there is a good deal to learn from his country's experience with urban
development, both in terms of the maintenance of a climate of "livability", and in terms
of the recent peaceful absorption of a vast quantity of illiterate and semi-literate farm
workers into city life and in training them for jobs within the industrial system. On the
other hand it is probable that this country could profit from a study of American laws
regarding collective bargaining. It is apparent, however, that a highly profitable Interchange
of ideas could and should occur.
19. Frummer v. Hilton Int'l Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 539, 227 N.E.2d 851, 855, 281
N.Y.S.2d 41, 46 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
20. Morris Asinof & Sons, Inc. v. Freudenthal, 195 App. Div. 79, 186 N.Y.S. 383 (1st
Dep't 1921), aff'd mem., 233 N.Y. 564, 135 N.E. 919 (1922).
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treatises2l and the Restatement, 22 however, assert that identical cross offers
cannot create a contract. How, they query, can there be a contract without an
acceptance that it is referable to a communicated offer? An American lawyer
in attempting to rely on the New York decision despite the well nigh unanimous
criticism it has received, can find respectable arguments for it among German,
Swiss and Austrian writers.2 If the parties have manifested assent to the same
terms and, at least, if this manifestation arises out of on-going negotiations,
what need is there to impose the additional requirement that there be an offer
and acceptance? Indeed one of the most illuminating parts of the book from
the point of view of purely American law and practice is Professor Schlesinger's
masterful assault on the notion that it is only rarely that a contract is reached
24
without a process of offer and acceptance.
All of the above discussion, however, does not in itself explain the importance of these volumes. If I am correct, this study will have a great seminal
influence. We need, we almost certainly will have, and these volumes point
the way towards, multinational treatises on the law of contracts, torts, insurance,
domestic relations, etc. We need such studies for a number of reasons. First,
it is plainly wasteful to ignore the legal experience and thinking of the rest of
the world, particularly those parts which have similar economic and social
structures and have wrestled with the same problems as we. Second, in earlier
days it was relatively rare that an American lawyer would be concerned with
in depth problems of foreign law; today, in many law offices such problems are
routine. It has always been the duty of legal scholarship to provide treatises in
fields where the practitioners were practicing. In this respect scholarship is
lagging seriously behind legal practice. An American lawyer can find any number
of works explaining, or from which he can distill, the advantages and disadvantages of choosing Delaware as perhaps the best place for his client to
incorporate his subsidiary. But what of incorporation in Lichtenstein, Curacao
or Luxemburg? Largely, the mystery has been solved by and kept within the
knowledge of specialized practitioners. Why should this knowledge be disseminated in the standard treatises on corporations?
Aside from aiding research into bread and butter questions such as where
to incorporate, legal scholarship has the function of improving the law. Recently
there appeared an excellent study demonstrating the need in the United States
for separate incorporation laws for close corporations.2 I can only surmise
how much more powerful the argument would have been had it been integrated with a study of the importance and utility in Germany of the GnbH and
similar corporate forms elsewhere. Justice Douglas, prior to being appointed to
the bench, developed a theory of respondeat superior based upon "enterprise"
21. 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 59 (1963) ; 1 S. Williston, Contracts § 23 (3d ed. 1957).
22. Restatement of Contracts § 23 (1932) ; Restatement (second) of Contracts § 23 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1964). The second Restatement does allow identical cross offers to form a
contract, but only in rather narrow circumstances.
23. 1 Schlesinger 702-04; 2 id. at 1613.
24. Id. at 1583-1601.
25. Kessler, With Limited Liability for All: Why Not a Partnership Corporation?,
36 Fordham L. Rev. 235 (1967).
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liability.2 6 In so doing he was doubtless unaware of, and therefore unable
to utilize, a vast body of foreign law and
scholarship, particularly in Italy,
' 27
on the highly useful concept of "enterprise.
The standard treatises do not include such information because it is improbable that any single author could successfully gather and synthesize the
necessary information. Professor Schlesinger and his task force have developed
a new method of team authorship pointing out how this can be done. They have
done it well. They will be followed.
JOSEPH M. PERILLO*
26. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L.J. 584 (1929).
27. See M. Cappelletti, J. Merryman and J.Perillo, The Italian Legal System 226, 237
(1967).
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